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How Party Platforms on Immigration Become Policy 
 
 
We focus on one of the most salient policy issues of our time, immigration, and evaluate whether 
the salience of immigration in governing parties’ manifestos translates into actual legislative 
activity on immigration. We contend that democratic policymakers have genuine incentives to do 
so. Furthermore, we argue that the country context matters for pledge-fulfillment, and we find 
that the migration salience of governing parties’ manifestos more strongly translates into policy 
activity when the level of immigration restrictions is higher and when countries’ economies 
perform well. This research has important implications for our understanding of the relationships 
between economic performance, democratic representation, and immigration policy making.  
 




Whether governing parties’ election stances influence subsequent policies that are enacted is a 
traditional question for scholars of democracy (e.g., Keman 2002). In fact, at the core of the 
responsible party model of democracy is the notion that parties should keep their campaign 
promises. However, do governing parties actually follow through on their platform policy 
commitments that they campaign with in elections? It has been reported that citizens believe the 
answer to this question is “no” (Naurin 2009; Thomson 2011), yet existing research on the 
connection between manifesto promises and government policy does paint a more optimistic 
picture. An extensive body of empirical work examines whether the policy preferences of 
citizens ultimately produce government legislative action (e.g., Erikson et al. 2002; Soroka and 
Wlezien 2010; Kang and Powell 2010). In order for the democratic translation of citizen 
preferences into policy to occur, parties must commit to the policies that they promote during 
election campaigns (McDonald and Budge 2005). Numerous country-specific studies have 
addressed this pledge-fulfillment nexus, e.g., Thomson (1999) examines the Netherlands while 
Naurin (2009; 2011) focuses on Sweden. There is also research on the United States (e.g., David 
1971; Elling 1979), the United Kingdom (e.g., Bara 2005), Australia (e.g., Carson et al. 2019), or 
Spain (e.g., Artés and Bustos 2008), among many others. Comparative work is less readily 
available, although exceptions do exist. Naurin et al. (2019) provide an edited volume on 12 
countries, while Thomson et al. (2017) offer the arguably most comprehensive cross-national 
investigation covering over 20,000 pledges made in 57 election campaigns in 12 countries. Most 
of these and related works, including Thomson et al. (2017), report evidence that parties follow 
through on their promises and fulfill their campaign pledges.    
We focus on whether parties pursue legislative action that meets their electoral campaign 
emphasis once in power and shed new light on this aspect of the pledge-fulfillment nexus for one 
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of the most salient policy issues of our time, immigration. Specifically, we evaluate whether 
governing parties that devoted more space to immigration issues in their manifestos subsequently 
pass more immigration-related legislation (see Money 2010; Abou-Chadi 2016; Helbling and 
Kalkum 2018; Böhmelt 2019). And, if so, under what conditions is this relationship amplified or 
weakened? We offer a comparative analysis that examines these aspects of the pledge-fulfillment 
nexus in the immigration context across 14 Western democracies, which offers wider coverage 
than a majority of studies that focus on a single country. Several other contributions are given by 
our work. 
First, while there is extensive evidence that parties do follow-up on their campaign 
promises (e.g., Thomson et al. 2017), it seems that the promises considered more important, or 
more salient to voters, are less likely to be kept. Mellon et al. (2019) analyze the 2017 manifesto 
of the UK Conservatives and report that about 69 percent of their promises were met – yet, those 
issues deemed more salient by the electorate did not turn into policy action. Pertinent to our 
work, the Conservatives’ promise to reduce net migration to below 100,000 has not been kept. 
Indeed, migration is one of the most salient current policy issues, with the movement of people 
across borders having risen significantly over the last few decades. According to the United 
Nations International Migration Report 2019, the total population of international migrants, i.e., 
people residing in a country other than their country of birth, has more than doubled since 2000 
to about 272 million. The scale of international migration makes it a global phenomenon, and a 
“fundamental driver of social, economic, and political change” (Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005: 
99) affecting each state worldwide. What is more, migration is consistently seen as one of the 
most important policy issues in Europe over the past few decades: using Eurobarometer data, 
Böhmelt et al. (2020) report that migration was perceived as one of the top policy priorities in 
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several European countries since 2003. In the UK, for example, this figure is particularly high 
with almost 30 percent (on average in 2003-2017) of the population reporting that it is one of the 
two most important issues their country faces. With the previously discussed notion in mind that 
electoral promises on more salient policy issues are less likely to kept, immigration policy merits 
special attention.  
Second, and related to our emphasis on immigration, the question about citizen 
preferences, governing policies, and pledge fulfillment is usually addressed on (traditional) 
economic issues such as social spending, foreign aid, welfare state generosity, or pension reform 
(Kang and Powell 2010; McDonald and Budge 2005; Budge et al. 2012; Ezrow et al. 2020; 
Häusermann 2010). Rarely do studies depart from this focus to more specific issue dimensions, 
although exceptions do exist. For example, Knill et al. (2010) analyze how governing parties’ 
policy positions influence environmental policies. Here, we extend existing work by examining 
immigration policy. Ultimately, we can substantiate the theoretical arguments that governing 
policy pledges on immigration are ultimately reflected in government policies.  
Third, we shed light on the conditions that drive whether parties with salient immigration 
platforms pass more immigration-related legislation. This “complements the saliency approach 
to the mandate model, in which scholars focus on the relative emphases parties place on different 
policy themes” (Thomson et al. 2017: 528). On one hand, we concentrate on the political rights 
of immigrants. These vary significantly across countries and the type of immigration rhetoric and 
policy governing parties propose is likely influenced by that. On the other hand, we build on the 
literature that highlights constraints on policy making (e.g., Tsebelis 2002; Lijphart 2012; 
Hellwig 2015) to evaluate whether a state’s economic performance influences governing parties 
carrying through their election platforms into policy. We report that economic growth has some 
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conditioning effect, with governments in recession being less able to pass legislative action even 
if there was a commitment on immigration before. Moreover, the relationship between 
immigration salience in party manifestos and immigration policy is more strongly pronounced 
when migration law is rather strict to begin with. 
Third, these results have crucial implications for the understanding of the relationships 
between economic performance, democratic representation, and immigration policy making. The 
conclusion that governing parties, even when it comes to salient issues like migration (see 
Böhmelt et al. 2020), implement policies that mirrors the importance of these issues in their 
election platforms is crucial for traditional theories of democracy and political representation. In 
elections, parties present a bundle of policies that citizens may find attractive. Presumably, 
parties would remain committed to their electoral platforms, but there is not always a widespread 
belief in the electorate that they do (see, e.g., Naurin 2009; Thomson 2011). Our findings show 
that governing parties are committed to following through on their election pledges, at least in 
terms of the number of policies mirroring salience of immigration, which is consistent with 
previous work in different issue areas (Thomson et al. 2017; Knill et al. 2010). However, we 
depart from earlier results as we extend the validity of the pledge-fulfillment hypothesis to the 
salient policy area of immigration that has heretofore been overlooked in the (pledge-fulfillment) 
literature.  
Furthermore, there are several factors that could constrain what governments do. For 
example, Tsebelis’s (2002) veto players framework suggests that political institutions facilitating 
power-sharing may make it difficult for any government to arrive at decisive policy changes (see 
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also Lijphart 2012; Thomson et al. 2017).1 Here, we follow more recent research on how 
economic performance shapes the policies that governments can or cannot implement. In 
particular, Ezrow et al. (2020) argue and present empirical evidence that governing parties are 
not as systematically responsive to public opinion on welfare state generosity when economies 
are in recession. Hence, there are several factors, relating to constraints that could throw off 
whether administrations follow through on their policy commitments in election campaigns. 
And, indeed, we find that economic performance as well as the restrictiveness of a country’s 
immigration policy regime matter in this regard.  
Finally, our work has key implications for understanding how immigration policies are 
implemented across Europe. Leaving a country to live in another state abroad is determined by 
multiple forces (for overviews, see, e.g., Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005; Breunig et al. 2012), 
and permanently moving to another state offers valuable gains for both migrants and their host 
societies (see, e.g., Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005: 103f; Dustmann and Frattini 2014; 
Hainmueller et al. 2017). However, governments can also experience a number of challenges 
related to the supply of goods and services when trying to manage large population inflows, and 
citizens may prefer policies or instruments for administrations to regulate migration against this 
background. Examining whether governing parties that have spent more attention to immigration 
in their manifestos subsequently pass more immigration-related legislation sheds new light on 




1 Similarly, Kriesi et al. (2006; 2008) and Hellwig (2015) demonstrate that political elites may be 
rather constrained in terms of policymaking (and policy pledges) as the economy opens. 
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Immigration Salience in Party Manifestos and Legislative Action 
Do governing parties’ campaign pledges on immigration influence legislative action? Our 
expectations follow from the tradition that the partisanship of government matters. In particular, 
parties may be policy-, office-, or vote-seeking (Müller and Strøm 1999). If they are indeed 
policy-seeking, we would expect that the policies parties promote during election campaigns and 
in their manifestos will be the same policies that they attempt to implement if they join the 
government. This expectation also remains valid when assuming parties to be office- or vote-
seeking (see also Böhmelt et al. 2016, 2017), since they ought to be concerned with 
implementing the policies on which they campaigned (Downs 1957). In fact, Karreth et al. 
(2013) show that parties moderating their positions by moving away from their core supporters 
may gain votes in the short-term (see also Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009), but then lose votes 
under longer time horizons. Hence, short-term changes in policy are met with long-term 
reputational and vote losses (see also Alvarez 1998). As a result, while in government, parties 
that are policy-, office-, or vote-seeking, ceteris paribus, are expected to emphasize the same 
issues they focused on in their campaigns.  
The underlying mechanism for this claim can be illustrated via the procedures of leader 
selection and gaining political power, which incentivize democratic governments to respond to 
constituents’ needs (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). Democratic executives can be removed 
more easily from office than their non-democratic counterparts due to, e.g., regular elections, and 
the electoral turnover constrains democratic governments’ policy choices (Breunig et al. 2012: 
830). Democratic administrations thus have more incentives than others to implement policies 
that favor their voters (Dahl 1971; see also Breunig et al. 2012). Democratic ideals suggest that 
citizens influence politics via multiple channels including casting their vote in elections. 
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Politicians then choose their policies accordingly to maximize chances to do well in the next 
election, and for governing parties this means implementing what they have promised in their 
campaigns. This leads to the outcome that politicians will adopt policy platforms that are closer 
to the ideal policies of the public (Downs 1957; see also Ezrow 2010), and for governing parties 
to strive for a stronger match between their campaign pledges and their legislative actions once 
in power.  
Evidence for the responsiveness of democratic governments to voters’ demands does 
exist (e.g., Adams et al. 2004). Previous research has also shown that pledge fulfillment is given 
for “bread and butter issues,” that governing parties do produce polices that are consistent with 
their platforms generally for the left-right dimension (McDonald and Budge 2005), fiscal 
policies (Blais et al. 1993; Bräuninger 2005), social policies (Hicks and Swank 1992; Huber et 
al. 1993), and the environment (Knill et al. 2010). Although Mellon et al. (2019) report that 
particularly salient issues are not characterized by pledge fulfillment (see also Thomson et al. 
2017), our considerations about parties’ reputational concerns and incentives for governing 
parties in democracies to keep their promises (see also Böhmelt 2019) lead us to formulate the 
following hypothesis:2  
 
 
2 Our argument and the first hypothesis focus on how salience in manifestos influences the 
number of policies implemented in turn. In other words, we address whether governing parties 
that devoted more space to immigration issues in their manifestos subsequently pass more 
immigration-related legislation. At this point, we are not concerned about the direction of 
policies or salience (i.e., whether policies or positions are in favor of more or less restrictive 
policies), but we return to this in the appendix. 
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Pledge-Fulfillment Hypothesis: Legislative policy action on immigration will reflect the 
emphasis on immigration in governing parties’ election manifestos.   
 
The literature also suggests that pledge fulfillment does not remain constant across 
contexts and, in turn, points to the possibility that political rights would condition the pledge-to-
policy effect. For example, the political rights of immigrants vary across countries (e.g., Helbling 
and Kalkum 2018). Where immigrants are treated more equally and they have more rights, they 
may be more politically active, because the opportunity structures are more permissive for 
political participation in this context (Kitschelt 1986). Just and Anderson (2014) analyze the 
political participation of immigrants in 25 countries and report that immigrants are more likely to 
be politically active where the public opinion climate favors them. However, this political action 
only extends to unconventional modes of political participation. Subscribing to this political-
rights dynamic, politicians protecting political rights would be more likely to carry through 
pledges on immigration as they anticipate that immigrants will become politically active if 
campaign pledges are ignored.  
By contrast, the immigration issue is more salient in countries that have failed to adopt 
stronger political rights. Countries with lower levels of political rights, i.e., with more 
restrictions, will have more “space” to disagree on political rights and related issues. Although 
there are no clear expectations about the relationship between political rights and immigration 
pledge fulfillment, it is more plausible to expect that the pledge-to-policy effect on immigration 
could be more strongly pronounced in countries that have weaker political rights protections, 




Political-Rights Hypothesis: Legislative policy action on immigration will reflect the 
emphasis on immigration in governing parties’ election manifestos more strongly in countries 
with more restrictive political rights of immigrants.  
 
Related to the arguments above about the importance of context, constraints also matter. 
Power-sharing and institutional checks affect governing policy (Lijphart 2012; Tsebelis 2002) 
and, more specifically, pledge fulfillment (Thomson et al. 2017; see also Knill et al. 2010). With 
respect to institutional constraints, in political systems that exhibit more institutional controls 
with a greater number of veto players, governing parties might find it more difficult to 
implement their platforms (Tsebelis 2002).3 The literature on the political economy of the 
welfare state looks at other important factors (or constraints) to explain governing policies. 
Stephens (1979) highlights factors like the power of labor and government partisanship, and 
“varieties of capitalism” studies feature relations between businesses, financial institutions, 
 
3 However, according to Lijphart (2012; see also McDonald and Budge 2005), governing 
coalitions in proportional political systems made up of several parties have frequently been 
generated from larger mandates from the public than single party majorities in political systems, 
or majoritarian systems (e.g., the UK). Thus, governing parties in proportional systems have a 
greater mandate to govern and they are more likely to be able to implement the policies that they 
propose in their election manifestos. These arguments are also consistent with Hobolt and 
Klemmensen (2008) who report that Danish governments are more responsive to public opinion 
than governments in the UK. While the mandate mechanism may be relevant here, it does not 
explain why previous studies have reported concentrated power-sharing to enhance pledge 
fulfillment on a number of other issues (see Thomson et al. 2017; Knill et al. 2010). 
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workers, and governments (Hall and Soskice 2001). Finally, there is research about how the 
macro-economy can pressure governments to compensate those adversely affected by 
globalization, deindustrialization, and other changes associated with advanced capitalism 
(Iversen and Cusack 2000). More recently, Ezrow et al. (2020) show that governments’ policy 
responsiveness to public opinion is conditional on the economy. Poor economic conditions can 
have an adverse effect on governments’ capacities to respond to citizen preferences.  
Similar to the political rights discussion, there are competing arguments as to how to 
apply the above arguments to immigration policy. On one hand, poor economies may inhibit 
governments from following through on “bread and butter” economic issues such as welfare 
state generosity (Ezrow et al. 2020). If this is the case, in the absence of being able to implement 
policies in costly policy areas, governments potentially search for less expensive policies to 
claim credit for during hard economic times. Restricting immigration by changing foreign visa 
rules, although expensive in the long term, is arguably cheaper than traditional economic 
spending policies in the short-term, e.g., when compared to national spending on health care, 
policing, education, and welfare. Thus, when the economy is not performing well, governments 
could potentially substitute following through on policy pledges in more traditionally expensive 
economic areas, with following through on policy pledges in the area of immigration.  
On the other hand, the claims about traditional spending policies may simply spillover to 
immigration and recessions will inhibit governing administrations with fulfilling their pledges 
with respect to immigration policy. Indeed, immigration policies, especially more restrictive 
ones, can be costly. Restricting migration can reduce a country’s overall economic growth (Bove 
and Elia 2017; Dustmann and Frattini 2014), while implementing more severe border controls, 
hiring more personnel to guard a country’s territory, as well as restrictive customs checks impose 
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costs on a state that it may find difficult to cope with when the economy performs poorly. And 
even less restrictive policies can have negative implications for the economy as several important 
distributional effects may lower wages in specific segments of a host country’s labor force 
(Borjas 2014). Thus, the arguments that have been made about poor economies restricting the 
range of policies of governments are likely to spillover and/or apply across a range of issues, 
including immigration, suggest that immigration pledges would similarly go unfulfilled in poorly 
performing economies. This discussion forms the basis for the second hypothesis: 
 
Economic-Conditions Hypothesis: Governing party platforms on immigration are more 
(less) readily implemented when the economy performs well (poorly).   
  
Research Design 
We make use of a unique and recent data set that has been released by Lehmann and Zobel 
(2018) who compiled information on party manifesto saliency estimates on immigration in 14 
countries and 43 elections between 1998 and 2013.4 The data we employ has two key 
advantages. First, Lehmann and Zobel (2018) derive the data from manifestos to provide parties’ 
“unified and unfiltered” immigration positions for countries and time points not covered in 
expert surveys and media studies. Second, the authors also rely on the new method of crowd 
coding, which, as discussed thoroughly in their paper, allows for a fast manual coding of political 
texts. The data from Lehmann and Zobel (2018) ultimately govern the country and time coverage 
of our analysis. 
 
4 We do not focus on parties’ partisanship. Instead, our focus lies on the salience toward 
migration issues in governing parties’ manifestos. 
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We employ the country/cabinet-year as our unit of analysis and the dependent variable is 
based on the Determinants of International Migration (DEMIG) Policy Database (Haas et al. 
2014).5 These data track policy changes in migration laws in the post-World War II period, with 
a larger spatial and temporal scope than most other data sets on migration policies.6  Each policy 
measure is coded via four variables – two items on the issue (policy area and tool) and two 
coding the group targeted (migrant category and geographic origin). 7 We focus on the number of 
immigration policy measures implemented in a given country-year (cabinet-year) as our 
outcome. Figure 1 plots this information for the 14 states included in the analysis. There is a 
significant amount of variation in the legislative action on immigration policy every year – both 
across countries as well as within each state over time. We use negative binomial regression 
models that incorporate a lagged dependent variable as well as fixed effects for countries and 
years. Intra-group, i.e., country-specific path dependencies and correlations are further captured 
 
5 The codebook is available at: https://www.imi-n.org/files/data/demig-policy-codebook.pdf. 
6 The theoretical argument applies to migration policies in general and we have little theoretical 
reason to distinguish between types of policies, e.g., regulations or control mechanisms. For a 
disaggregated approach, however, see the appendix that provides additional models. 
7 The policy area consists of four codes: border and land control, legal entry and stay, exit, and 
integration policies. The policy-tool variable captures the instrument used to implement a policy 
measure and consists of 28 codes, ranging from surveillance technology to work permits. The 
migrant-category variable identifies the migrant group targeted (e.g., low-skilled workers), 
whereas the geographical-origin variable includes the origin of the targeted migrant category 




by clustering the standard errors at this level. The appendix presents analyses based on 
alternative measures and operationalizations for the dependent variable. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Our main explanatory variable captures governing parties’ immigration saliency position. 
As a first step, using Döring and Manow (2012), we identified for each country-cabinet-year in 
our sample the parties participating in government. In turn, employing the data from Lehmann 
and Zobel (2018), we determined each party’s saliency position on immigration. According to 
their codebook, salience is calculated as the proportion of immigration and integration related 
quasi-sentences to the total number of quasi-sentences in party manifestos. This item thus varies 
between 0 and 100 percent for each governing party and we calculate the average across 
government parties to arrive at a final, averaged score of immigration salience per cabinet-year 
(our unit of analysis). Inter-election years are interpolated with the immigration-salience value 
from the last election. The core explanatory item, Immigration Salience, varies between 0.000 
and 16.045 percent with this approach.  
In light of the Political-Rights Hypothesis, we draw on the Immigration Policies in 
Comparison (IMPIC) project (Helbling et al. 2017) that offers a detailed conceptualization of the 
level of immigration policy restrictions in OECD countries. The data set makes a broad 
distinction between regulations and control mechanisms, internally and externally, while 
regulations refer to eligibility, conditions, status, and rights. In each area, the IMPIC project 
measures on a quasi-continuous scale between 0 and 1 how restrictive a policy is and there is an 
aggregated variable, i.e., an average across all items in the data set to capture the total level of 
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restrictiveness of immigration policies in a country. We rely on this variable, which receives 
higher values for more restrictive migration regimes in place, and interact it with Immigration 
Salience. Given the Economic-Conditions Hypothesis, we also multiply Immigration Salience 
with a variable capturing a country’s economic growth to model the postulated interaction effect. 
We use data from Armingeon et al. (2019) who compiled information on the yearly change (in 
percent) in a country’s nominal GDP, i.e., at current market prices. 
We consider a series of controls and follow earlier studies that have a similar focus as our 
work (see, e.g., Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005; Hansen and Köhler 2005; Howard 2010; Joppke 
2003; Givens and Luedtke 2005; Abou-Chadi 2016). We identified numerous variables that are 
arguably exogenous to the dependent variable in order to control for alternative mechanisms that 
influence the implementation of migration policies. First, based on data from the World Bank 
Development Indicators, we control for the total population size (or stock) of international 
migrants and refugees in a country. The World Bank defines the international migrant and 
refugee stock as “the number of people born in a country other than that in which they live. It 
also includes refugees.” The data underlying this item were originally obtained from national 
population censuses as well as states’ statistics on foreign-born (people who have residence in 
one country, but were born in another country) or foreign populations (people who are citizens of 
a country other than the country in which they reside). Hence, this item captures the entire 
population of foreign-born individuals in a state, and we log-transform it due to its rather skewed 
distribution. 
Second, we include three other variables that are taken from the World Bank 
Development Indicators. On one hand, not only may the economy matter for a conditional effect, 
but countries’ migration policies are often strongly linked to the economic development directly 
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(e.g., Freeman 1995: 886). We employ the log-transformed GDP per capita (in current US 
Dollars) to this end, which is defined as the gross domestic product divided by midyear 
population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus 
any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. We also 
control for unemployment in the form of its percent of the total labor force. On the other hand, 
population size is likely to be linked to the degree of preference heterogeneity in a society, which 
in turn could affect the public’s demand for migration policies (see Böhmelt 2019). We rely on a 
country’s midyear total population (also log-transformed), which counts all residents regardless 
of legal status or citizenship (except for refugees not permanently settled).  
Finally, we incorporate a variable to address the number of veto players that potentially 
constrain policy. We use Henisz’s (2002) item on political constraints, which, according to the 
author’s codebook, “estimates the feasibility of policy change (the extent to which a change in 
the preferences of any one actor may lead to a change in government policy) […]. [E]xtracting 
data from political science databases, it identifies the number of independent branches of 
government (executive, lower and upper legislative chambers) with veto power over policy 
change. The preferences of each of these branches and the status quo policy are then assumed to 
be independently and identically drawn from a uniform, unidimensional policy space. This 
assumption allows for the derivation of a quantitative measure of institutional hazards using a 
simple spatial model of political interaction.” Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the 
variables we have discussed in the research design. 
 





We begin the empirical analysis with a set of unconditional models that focus on testing the first 
hypothesis. Table 2 presents three models: the first one only includes the Immigration Salience 
variable next to the lagged dependent variable and fixed effects, and we omit all substantive 
controls. We introduce the latter to the estimation in Model 2, but discard our core predictor. 
Model 3 incorporates all explanatory variables we have discussed above except for the 
interactions including Migration Policy Restrictions or economic growth. The coefficients in the 
models can be interpreted as expected log-counts, i.e., for a one unit change in the predictor 
variable, the difference in the logs of expected counts is predicted to change by the respective 
regression coefficient, given the other predictor variables in the model are held constant. 
 
 




Most importantly for our argument, Immigration Salience is positively signed and 
significant at conventional levels. That is, the higher the salience of immigration as a policy issue 
for the parties that have formed a cabinet, the more immigration policies are likely to be 
implemented in turn. Including or excluding the controls does not substantively affect the size of 
the coefficient of Immigration Salience. Interpreted, the coefficient estimate of 0.069 translates 
into an expected increase of 1.071 in the number of immigration policies being implemented for 
a 1 percentage-point rise in Immigration Salience. Thus, our finding is not only statistically 
significant, but also substantively important as the size of the estimated effect is large. Figure 2 
sheds additional light on the substantive effects in which we plot the expected number of policies 
for each value of Immigration Salience. As demonstrated, the number of policies swiftly 
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increases from about 3.7 policies for a value of 0 in Immigration Salience to about 10 policies 
when our main predictor is at its maximum. In sum, linking these results back to our theory, we 
do indeed obtain support for the claim that governing parties that devoted more space to 
immigration issues in their manifestos subsequently pass more immigration-related legislation – 
with immigration being one of the most salient policy areas of our time. The results for the 
controls are rather inconclusive as the variables fail to reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance. 
We also propose that certain conditions may influence the relationship of our core 
variables of interest. First, there is the Political-Rights Hypothesis, which states that legislative 
policy action on immigration will reflect the emphasis on immigration in governing parties’ 
election manifestos more strongly in countries with more restrictive political rights of 
immigrants. Also, the Economic-Conditions Hypothesis states that governments follow their 
campaign pledges when economic performance improves. To test the expectations linked to 
these hypotheses, we have modified Model 3 by including Migration Policy Restrictions or GDP 
Growth and their respective interactions with Immigration Salience. Table 3 presents our results. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
The interaction terms are positively signed and significant at least at the 10 percent level 
in both Model 4 and Model 5. Brambor et al. (2006) remind us, however, that it is difficult to 
interpret signs, size, and statistical significance of many interaction models directly and, thus, we 
plot the marginal effects of Immigration Salience for different values of Migration Policy 
Restrictions and GDP Growth in Figure 3. First, this graph depicts a positive and significant 
marginal effect for Immigration Salience only for positive values of GDP Growth, i.e., when the 
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economic power of a country increases. In case of economic stagnation or decline, the results are 
inconclusive, suggesting that governments – even if their campaign pledges may have 
emphasized immigration – are less likely to follow-up on their promises and to implement more 
immigration-related policies. Figure 3 demonstrates, in more substantive terms, that a 4-
percentage point rise in Immigration Salience is linked to about one more immigration policy 
when the economy grows by 0.5 percent.  
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
Second, governing parties are more likely to pursue legislative action on immigration 
policies when they have emphasized this issue in their election campaigns and if policy 
restrictions are comparatively restrictive already. The left panel in Figure 3 shows that the 
positive and significant effect of Immigration Salience we report in Table 2 above only holds 
when Migration Policy Restrictions is above a value of about 0.4. In other words, more 
restrictive environments seem to reinforce the effect of Immigration Salience we identified 
before. As in the unconditional models, the control variables are statistically insignificant.   
 
[Table 3 here]  
 
 
To put these conditional results into perspective, it is important to consider the recent 
studies that suggest that the policies viewed as salient by the electorate are less likely to make it 
into legislative action (Mellon et al. 2019; Thomson et al. 2017). Our findings do not necessarily 
question this important insight; rather, they show that pledge fulfillment can work for salient 
policy issues under some conditions. Specifically, more restrictive migration regimes seem to be 
linked to a rather “salient policy environment” already, and when governments can “afford” 
21 
 
policy changes (see Ezrow et al. 2020), the translation of salient electorate preferences into 
policy action becomes more likely. To assess the robustness of our results, we changed a series 
of model specifications and re-estimated our core model in the appendix. These robustness 
checks focus on the actual level of restrictiveness in migration policy regimes, the disaggregation 
of our salience variable, a different outcome variable capturing the share of restrictive 
immigration policies implemented in a given country-year, weighing our main explanatory 
variable by cabinet parties’ seat shares,8 and, finally, estimating the parameters of  a 
simultaneous equations model. All these additional analyses are reported in the appendix and 
provide further support of our arguments. 
 
Conclusion 
Do parties pursue legislative action that meets their electoral campaign emphasis once in office? 
The motivation behind our article stems from the puzzling observation that administrations have, 
on average, a rather solid record in fulfilling their pledges. However, this does not apply to the 
most crucial policy issues (e.g., Mellon et al. 2019). Focusing on migration as one of the most 
salient policy issues of our time, we developed hypotheses that concentrate on how policies are 
made in this area. First, the Pledge-Fulfillment Hypothesis states that governments are likely to 
have strong and genuine incentives to implement what they have promised in their election 
campaigns – and we argue that this should apply for some of the most crucial policy domains 
such as migration. Ultimately, governing parties that devoted more space to immigration issues 
in their manifestos are in turn more likely to pass more immigration-related legislation. In the 
 
8 We also examined the special role of the parties of the head of government (e.g., the prime 
minister) and whether single-party governments differ from coalition cabinets.  
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words of Thomson et al. (2017: 528), this “complements the saliency approach to the mandate 
model, in which scholars focus on the relative emphases parties place on different policy 
themes.” Second, we proposed that context matters for pledge fulfillment, by evaluating the 
conditional effects of political rights and economic performance on pledge fulfillment. 
 Our findings make crucial contributions to the literatures on democratic representation, 
economic performance, and (immigration) policy making. Arguably most importantly, we shed 
light on the ambiguity surrounding the saliency approach in the pledge-fulfillment nexus when it 
comes to salient policy issues. While previous work does not find support for the notion that 
cabinets meet their promises with legislative action when it comes to salient electorate 
preferences, we highlight that it may well be given, but only under some specific circumstances: 
a growing economy. As a result, we offer a key finding to the study of saliency and pledge 
fulfillment, and also inform policymakers when legislative action is possible, can be afforded, 
and perhaps even should be pushed through to ensure political survival. For instance, with an 
estimated economic growth of 1.4 percent in the UK 2019 but a projected decline for 2020,9 the 
administration is predicted to successfully implement their campaign pledges on immigration in 
the short-term – but that their longer-term post-Brexit commitments on immigration will be more 
difficult to fulfill.  
We believe that our empirical findings represent an important step forward for 
understanding saliency, pledge fulfillment, and immigration policy. We conclude that parties 
with rather salient immigration issues in their manifestos subsequently pass more immigration-
related legislation once in power, and that the translation of pledges into legislative action is 
facilitated by a strong economy and more restrictive immigration policy regimes.  
 
9 See online at the UK Office for National Statistics: https://tinyurl.com/ujuf3rz.  
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However, these conclusions come with three caveats. First, our main analysis focuses on 
the “volume” of immigration-related content in governing parties’ manifestos and the “volume” 
of immigration legislation. The appendix provides some evidence to suggest that, for 
immigration policy, salience in election manifestos and the direction of subsequent policy 
outputs are related.  Data limitations, however, prevent us from conducting a cross-national 
longitudinal analysis that addresses the specific content of both the governing parties’ 
immigration promises and the legislation that they subsequently pass. A second, related, 
limitation of our work is that we do not characterize the correspondence between more specific 
policy objectives within immigration outlined in party platforms and the laws that are then 
enacted and issued. Hence, because we do not analyze specific objectives in manifestos and 
specific laws that are subsequently enacted, the analyses arguably lack precision. Third, 
endogeneity concerns remain: do parties pass more immigration laws in the aftermath of 
discussing immigration because they want to demonstrate their ability to follow through on 
promises as the pledge fulfillment literature suggests? Or are parties devoting more attention to 
the issue of immigration because they anticipate legislative action on the topic? While we 
partially address these concerns in the appendix in which the parameters of a simultaneous 
equations model are estimated, more precise time-related measures could be employed.  The 
above limitations notwithstanding, our analysis sheds light on the saliency approach in the 
literature as we are confident that the salience of immigration in party platforms corresponds 
with the overall production of policies (under some circumstances). 
There are several important avenues for future research. Unsurprisingly, several of these 
are related to the limitations discussed in the paragraph above. Scholars may want to compile 
more detailed and disaggregated data on parties’ campaign promises and subsequent policy 
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action. Thompson et al. (2017), among others, suggest that text analysis of the content of party 
manifestos and laws is likely to be a fruitful approach here, allowing us to distill particular policy 
promises to cross-reference them against specific bills. Furthermore, with respect to endogeneity, 
a more detailed empirical analysis, potentially one that parses out time more precisely, is needed 
to deal with the underlying causal mechanisms driving pledge fulfillment. 
We also hope to have initiated a focus on the conditions that allow for the translation of 
parties’ campaign pledges into governmental policies. We have focused on immigration policies, 
in the context of political rights and economic growth (and controlled for institutional checks 
such as veto players). Yet, there are several future studies of pledge fulfillment that follow from 
the analyses presented here. For example, parties with democratic organizations may be more 
likely to follow through on campaign promises (Lehrer 2012; Schumacher, De Vries, and Vis 
2013), because the activists who select leadership are committed to seeing their parties’ election 
manifesto policies implemented. Furthermore, it is largely assumed that there are electoral 
consequences for failing to implement campaign pledge commitments, and these effects may 
indeed be stronger with respect to immigration.  
To summarize, our results support the finding that pledge fulfillment occurs as it relates 
to the salience of immigration. Additionally, immigration pledge fulfillment occurs more readily 
in countries that restrict political rights and that exhibit strong economic performance. This study 
thus contributes to our understanding of how the salience of immigration in parties’ election 
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Dots depict the number of immigration policies per year (horizontal axes) and country. The plot 
is based on the Determinants of International Migration (DEMIG) Policy Database (Haas et al. 







Figure 2. Immigration Salience and the Predicted Number of Immigration Policies 
 
Dashed lines depict 90 percent confidence intervals. Rug plot along the horizontal axis indicates 
the distribution of Immigration Salience. The calculations are based on Model 3 (while holding 
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Dashed lines depict 90 percent confidence intervals. Rug plots on the horizontal axes indicate the 
distribution of Migration Policy Restrictions. The calculations are based on Model 4 (while 
holding all other variables constant at their means). The marginal effect of zero is marked by the 









Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
  Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Immigration Policies 139 5.554 3.824 0.000 17.000 
Immigration Policiest-1 137 5.788 
 
3.739 0.000 17.000 
Immigration Salience 139 4.330 3.578 0.000 16.045 
Migration Policy Restrictions 97 0.398 0.057 0.000 0.558 
GDP Growth 139 3.556 3.563 -9.413 11.614 
Migrant and Refugee Population 139 14.540 1.393 12.276 17.669 
Political Constraints 139 0.485 0.068 0.335 0.691 
Population 139 16.587 1.279 15.235 19.571 
GDP per capita  139 10.704 0.376 9.594 11.543 
Unemployment 139 7.026 3.982 2.493 26.094 
 












Table 2. Analyzing Immigration Policies: The Pledge-Fulfillment Hypothesis 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Immigration Policiest-1      -0.068***      -0.066***      -0.068*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Immigration Salience       0.069***      0.059** 
 (0.026)  (0.024) 
Migrant and Refugee Population       -0.715      -0.654 
  (0.570) (0.559) 
Political Constraints       -1.161      -1.076 
  (1.604) (1.590) 
Population       -4.053      -3.837 
  (6.472) (6.431) 
GDP per capita  1.408 1.237 
  (1.516) (1.569) 
Unemployment  0.020 0.014 
  (0.047) (0.048) 
Obs. 137 137 137 
Log Pseudolikelihood -330.427   -328.821 -327.978 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table entries are coefficients, and robust standard errors clustered on country are in parentheses. 
The dependent variable is Immigration Policies, which is based on the amount of attention 
devoted to immigration policies in the governing parties’ election manifestos. Constants are 
included in all models, but omitted from presentation.  









Table 3. Analyzing Immigration Policies: Conditional Effects 
 
 Model 4 Model 5 
Immigration Policiest-1      -0.085***      -0.068*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) 
Immigration Salience   -0.907*     0.043** 
 (0.489) (0.021) 
Migration Policy Restrictions        3.773  
       (5.900)  
Immigration Salience × Migration Policy Restrictions        2.343**  
       (1.170)  
GDP Growth       -0.059*** 
  (0.023) 
Immigration Salience × GDP Growth   0.004* 
  (0.003) 
Migrant and Refugee Population      -0.074      -0.854 
 (0.673) (0.573) 
Political Constraints       1.848      -0.890 
 (1.930) (1.582) 
Population      -4.101      -4.751 
 (7.819) (6.197) 
GDP per capita   2.160* 1.295 
 (1.264) (1.536) 
Unemployment 0.110 0.001 
 (0.046) (0.045) 
Obs. 95 137 
Log Pseudolikelihood -225.215 -326.565 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
 
Table entries are coefficients, and robust standard errors clustered on country are in parentheses. 
The dependent variable is Immigration Policies, which is based on the amount of attention 
devoted to immigration policies in the governing parties’ election manifestos. Constant is 
included, but omitted from presentation.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
